Captagon: understanding today's illicit market. by unknown
Captagon: understanding 
today’s illicit market
EMCDDA PAPERS
Abstract: Originally, Captagon® was the 
main brand name for a medicinal product 
containing fenetylline as its active ingredient. 
It is no longer produced today or used for 
therapeutic purposes. Nevertheless, many 
countries in the Middle East regularly report 
seizures of a drug known as ‘captagon’ as part 
of their reporting obligations to international 
organisations. Captagon is also reported to 
be a commonly used stimulant in the Middle 
East and, to a lesser extent, some countries 
bordering the European Union, while some 
indicators suggest that European countries 
may be a source of the captagon consumed 
in these countries. In addition, some recent 
media reports have linked this drug to 
perpetrators of terrorist acts in Europe or 
terrorist groups based in areas of conflict in 
the Middle East. This has led to heightened 
interest in and concern about this drug, 
although only limited information is available 
on what the substance reported as captagon 
actually is and where it comes from.
This report therefore aims to provide an 
overview of what is known about the 
captagon phenomenon, and how it may 
concern Europe, to assist those working in 
the illicit drugs field who may need to respond 
to the issue. It reviews how the drug known 
as captagon has evolved from the medicinal 
product Captagon® into illicitly produced and 
marketed tablets, which generally appear to 
contain other substances, most commonly 
amphetamine, despite bearing the logo 
that was used on the original Captagon® 
tablets. It also reviews what is known about 
the current production, supply and use of 
captagon. Finally, it highlights how the often 
sensationalist media reports of special links 
between captagon use and terrorist activity 
in Europe are not supported by evidence, 
although there may be some opportunistic 
links between drug use and supply in general 
and terrorism.
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I Introduction
Originally, Captagon® was the main brand name for a medicinal 
product containing fenetylline as its active ingredient. It is 
no longer produced today or used for therapeutic purposes. 
Nevertheless, many countries in the Middle East (1) regularly 
report seizures of a drug known as ‘captagon’ as part of their 
reporting obligations to international organisations. Captagon 
is also reported to be a commonly used stimulant in both 
the Middle East and some countries bordering the European 
(1) For the purposes of this report, the term ‘Middle East’ refers to the following 
countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen, collectively referred to as the ‘Arabian Peninsula’, as well as Israel, 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. 
Union, and drug seizures indicate that European countries may 
sometimes be the source of the captagon consumed in these 
countries (see Figure 1). In addition, some recent media reports 
have noted that perpetrators of terrorist acts in Europe have 
used this drug or that it is being produced or used by groups 
based in areas of conflict in the Middle East. Media accounts 
in this area have been not always accurate and sometimes 
sensationalist, and the drug has even been referred to on 
occasions as ‘the terrorist drug’, ‘jihadi magic potion’ or the 
‘Daesh drug’ (ARTE, 2015; Orsini, 2015; Des Déserts, 2016).
FIGURE 1
Amphetamines, precursors, captagon: production, trafficking and consumption
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Source: Various UNODC and INCB reports.
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However, the information available on both the supply of 
captagon and its use and associated harms is very limited, 
making it difficult to accurately assess the extent and nature 
of use or its impact on public health. Nevertheless, sufficient 
information exists to allow us to provide an overall assessment 
of the situation and comment on some aspects of supply, 
although the reader should be aware that this analysis must 
necessarily be viewed with caution because of the limited 
information available. This report therefore aims to provide an 
overview of what is known about the captagon phenomenon, 
and how it may concern Europe, to assist those working in 
the illicit drugs field who may be involved in responding to the 
issue. To achieve this, we briefly describe the history of the use 
of Captagon® as a medical product, consider how this is linked 
to the emergence of illicit captagon, and review what is known 
about the latter’s current production, supply and use.
In this report, the term Captagon® will be used strictly to refer 
to the original pharmaceutical product and the term captagon 
to refer to illicitly produced tablets or to reports of drugs seized 
or used that are described as captagon.
Note on the methodology
The information presented in this report has been 
obtained from the following sources:
1)  A multilingual (Dutch, English, French, German, 
Portuguese and Spanish) search of published 
scientific and grey literature and open sources. 
It included European Union agencies (EMCDDA, 
Europol, including the European Multidisciplinary 
Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) and 
the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Training (CEPOL)) and international agencies and 
governmental sources, including the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB), United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Observatoire français 
des drogues et des toxicomanies (OFDT), US Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Internal Security 
Forces (ISF)-Lebanon, Agence nationale de sécurite 
du médicament et des produits de santé (ANSM) and 
the US Department of State.
2) A fact-finding mission to Lebanon.
3)  Interviews with experts from Afghanistan, Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.
Publicly available sources are listed in the references 
section of this report. Where restricted sources were 
used, it is noted in the text.
I  The development of captagon use — from medicine to illicit drug
A review of the history of the medicinal product Captagon®, its 
former therapeutic uses and its transformation into a common 
drug of misuse in some countries, which is very different from 
the original product, both illustrates the limitations of the 
evidence on the topic and provides a backdrop against which 
to consider the current situation.
I The medicinal product Captagon®
Captagon® was the brand name of a psychoactive medicine 
produced in the 1960s by the German company Degussa 
Pharma Gruppe. It was sold as whitish-coloured tablets 
marked with a characteristic logo comprising two half-moons 
(see Figure 2). It was mainly prescribed as a treatment for 
attention deficit disorder, narcolepsy and as a central nervous 
system stimulant. Its two main markets were Europe and the 
Middle East.
Captagon® tablets contained 50 milligrams of fenetylline, 
a synthetic drug of the phenethylamine family to which 
amphetamine also belongs. Following ingestion, fenetylline 
is metabolised into amphetamine and theophylline (a natural 
alkaloid, bronchodilator and mild stimulant from the same 
family as caffeine (2)), and so it can be difficult to determine 
by forensic investigation if fenetylline, or a combination of 
amphetamine and theophylline, has been consumed.
FIGURE 2
Captagon tablets
Photo © Department of Identification and Forensic Science, Israel Police.
(2) Theophylline is present in coffee, tea and cocoa, among other things. It is not 
controlled under United Nations drug control conventions.
EMCDDA PAPERS I Captagon: understanding today’s illicit market
4 / 21
Captagon® and doping
Media reports suggest that misuse of Captagon® may 
have occurred in Europe during the period 1970-1990, 
particularly in sport as a performance-enhancing 
substance. For example, in France, Captagon® was 
linked to an important cycling doping case in 1987 (Le 
Monde, 1987a) and was also reported to be used in other 
sports, including professional football during the 1990s 
(Le Monde, 2006; Müller and Belhoste, 2015). The use 
of stimulants, ‘especially Captagon’, was also reported 
as ‘commonplace’ in French rugby during the 1980s 
and 1990s (Senate, 2013; Broussard, 2015). There are 
also similar reports in relation to professional football 
in Germany (Le Monde, 1987b; Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
2007; Le Matin, 2013).
In 1986 fenetylline was included in Schedule II of the United 
Nations (UN) Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 (3). 
Following this, signatory countries moved to prohibit production 
and use. However, in some countries a few specific medical 
uses continued to be allowed for some time. For example, until 
2013, the ANSM (the French National Agency for Medicines 
and Health Products Safety) still allowed small quantities of 
Captagon® to be used for patients presenting with narcolepsy, 
making France one of the five countries in the world (with 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) that 
reported the use of fenetylline for medical purposes at that time. 
With respect to production, the INCB reports that no country has 
manufactured fenetylline since 2009 and ‘by the end of 2009, 
[worldwide] stocks of fenetylline had been virtually depleted’ 
(INCB, 2011a, p. 38). Nevertheless, the INCB continues to make 
small estimates of the global quantities of fenetylline needed for 
medical or research purposes (180 g in 2015, for example). This 
implies that the drug was available and used to a very limited 
extent for some time after 2009 (INCB, 2015, 2016a) (4).
Although some countries held stocks of fenetylline at the time 
it was placed under international control (e.g. in 1987 the 
INCB reported that stocks of the drug amounting to almost 
4 tonnes (5) were held in Germany, Spain and Switzerland), 
(3) In the 1971 UN Convention, the chemical name of fenetylline is 
7-[2-[(-α-methylphenethyl)amino]ethyl]theophylline.
(4) The annual reports from the INCB include statistics on imports and exports 
of controlled psychotropic substances as reported by all countries. They 
can therefore be used to derive a minimum estimate of the stocks available 
worldwide for a given year. The most recent of these reports, which contains 
data for 2014, states that there are no exports of fenetylline. However, the 
imported quantities reported are high: 10.6 tonnes in 2014 and 9.8 tonnes 
in 2013. This is difficult to understand, as it is reported that the largest stocks 
worldwide in 2004, held by the Netherlands, amounted to 212 kg, and that 
fenetylline had not been manufactured anywhere since 2009 (INCB, 2006; 
INCB, 2015).
(5) In 1988 the INCB estimated the worldwide medical requirements for 
fenetylline at 350 kg per year. Stocks estimated at 4 tonnes in 1987 are 
therefore sufficient to cover more than 11 years of global consumption at 1988 
levels. 
most of these (all the Swiss and half of the German stocks) 
were reportedly destroyed in the early 1990s (INCB, 2011a, 
2016b). The remaining German stocks (estimated in 2000 
at 573 kg) were exported to the Netherlands in 2001. It is 
not reported what became of the Spanish stocks. Destroying 
stocks was meant to put an end to ‘sporadic’ attempts at 
diverting fenetylline to the illicit markets by the use of false 
import authorisations. However the INCB notes that these 
attempts were only rarely successful. By the mid-2000s, the 
Netherlands was the only country known to still hold large 
quantities of fenetylline (reported to be 212 kg at the end 
of 2005). Following this, there were only sporadic reports of 
movements on the fenetylline market, with the last reported by 
the INCB occurring in 2009 (6).
Despite the INCB reporting that world stocks of fenetylline 
had been largely depleted by 2009, reports continued into the 
2010s implying that the drug might still be being diverted into 
the illicit drug market. For example, in 2016 the US Department 
of State described Lebanon as ‘a transit point for [...] 
fenethylline’ (US Department of State, 2016), while millions of 
captagon tablets have been reported as being seized annually 
since the end of the 1990s in Europe, Turkey, Africa and the 
Middle East (DEA, 2003; Bernas, 2015; Loumé, 2015; Global 
Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016). These 
apparently conflicting reports raise questions about whether 
the substances being seized originated from diversion of the 
medicine Captagon® or are the result of illicit production or 
falsified supplies, which may contain something else entirely.
I From diversion to illicit production
Until the end of the 1990s the diversion of fenetylline stocks 
may have initially allowed traffickers from eastern Europe, 
especially Bulgaria, to supply emerging markets for stimulants 
in the Middle East with tablets containing fenetylline (INCB, 
1991; Al-Gharably and Al-Obaid, 1993; Courrier International, 
2015). However, it appears that, as stocks of the medicine 
became exhausted and control measures intensified, gradually 
other substances may have been introduced into tablets sold 
as captagon.
The main source of information to support this comes from 
the analysis of drug seizures (see the box below). In only a few 
early reports is fenetylline reported to be present in seized illicit 
captagon tablets (Al-Gharably and Al-Obaid, 1993). Virtually 
all the contemporary information available suggests that 
the tablets seized on the drug market in recent years are not 
diverted Captagon® tablets but clandestinely manufactured 
(6) Some of the stocks in the Netherlands were reportedly exported to Belgium 
(68 kg in 2005), which subsequently re-exported 7.6 kg of this to Germany and 
France (INCB, 2006). In 2009, Belgium noted that it had exported 6 kg and 
Germany reported that it had imported 5 kg (INCB, 2015). 
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tablets that are marked with a similar logo (see Figure 3) but do 
not contain fenetylline. A note of caution here: there has been 
only limited forensic analysis of seized illicit captagon tablets, 
therefore the composition of most reported captagon seizures 
is unknown. However, the information available suggests 
that amphetamine and often caffeine are the psychoactive 
substances most likely to be present, although it should also 
be noted that tablet content appears highly variable.
(7) Verbal communication from the Lebanese Customs authorities, Port of Beirut, 
18 May 2016.
FIGURE 3
Tablet punch (stamp) with the characteristic Captagon® 
logo comprising two half-moons found in a dismantled 
illicit laboratory
Photo © OCRTIS/DEASRI
Data from forensic analysis of captagon seizures
For the purposes of this review, data on the forensic 
composition of seized captagon tablets were identified 
from Bulgaria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, 
Turkey and Yemen, which covered the period 1992 to 
2013. These consistently show amphetamine to be the 
principal psychoactive drug present, often combined with 
other substances (Al-Mazroua, undated; Al-Gharably and 
Al-Obaid, 1993; Dimova and Dinkof, 1994; Alabdalla, 2005; 
Nevescanin, 2008; DEA, 2009; UNODC, 2009; TUBIM, 2013; 
Demirkiran et al., 2014; German BKA, 2016). In a few cases, 
however, methamphetamine rather than amphetamine 
was reported to be present. Interestingly, in some tablets 
the presence of amphetamine together with theophylline 
suggests that illicit producers may have been trying to more 
accurately reproduce the effects of the original formulation 
of the medicinal product Captagon®.
Not all seized captagon tablets analysed contained 
amphetamine. In Saudi Arabia, for example, typically 
between 12 % and 16 % of the tablets tested were 
composed of mixtures of other substances, not all of which 
were psychoactive. These included caffeine, ephedrine, 
chloroquine, quinine, theophylline and paracetamol 
(Al-Mazroua, undated; Al-Gharably and Al-Obaid, 1993). 
Similarly captagon tablets analysed from two recent (2016) 
seizures in Lebanon were found to contain only caffeine (7).
When amphetamine was present, the amount contained in 
individual tablets was highly variable. For example, analysis 
conducted in Saudi Arabia found that amphetamine was 
present only as a ‘trace amount’ in half the tablets tested. 
In contrast over one third (38 %) contained amphetamine 
in quantities that were described as ‘considerable’ (Al-
Mazroua, undated). Similarly, tests carried out by the 
DEA on four illicit captagon seizures made in Iraq in 2009 
found that the tablets contained mixtures of between 7 
and 20 mg amphetamine, 30 and 65 mg caffeine, 14 and 
39 mg theophylline and 9 and 21 mg paracetamol (DEA, 
2009). This is similar to an analysis reported in 2013 by 
the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) of four samples 
from different Lebanese seizures of captagon in which the 
tablets contained between 8 and 14 % amphetamine, 12 
and 35 % caffeine, 10 and 14 % theophylline and 6 and 
20 % paracetamol (German BKA, 2016). The most recent 
data emerged as a result of Operation Missing Link, led 
by the INCB between April 2016 and January 2017. They 
largely confirmed previous results. Therefore, forensic 
profiling analysis by the German BKA of samples from 65 
different seizures of captagon tablets, made in Jordan, 
Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates, concluded that 
none of the pills tested contained fenetylline but that the 
main active ingredient was amphetamine in combination 
with other substances including caffeine, theophylline, 
quinine and paracetamol. The vast majority (82 %) of the 
amphetamine found in the tablets had been manufactured 
from the benzyl methyl ketone (BMK) precursor alpha-
phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN; see box ‘The precursors of 
amphetamine’), and seizure information suggests that BMK 
glycidic derivatives are also used (BKA, 2017; INCB 2018). It 
is worth noting that APAAN and glycidic derivatives of BMK 
were used to manufacture amphetamine in Europe in the 
period 2015-2016 (EMCDDA, 2018).
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I Information on patterns of captagon use
Nowadays, reports of widespread use of captagon as 
a stimulant mainly emanate from the Middle East and from 
some countries bordering the European Union. However, very 
little contemporary information is available on the consumer 
markets for captagon in these countries, making it difficult 
to describe the dynamics of these markets. Nevertheless, 
anecdotal and expert reports, as well as inference from supply-
side information, suggest that in many countries the use of 
captagon as a stimulant may be significant, although currently 
not quantifiable. Interpreting both demand and supply data 
is hampered by the fact that amphetamine-type stimulants 
(ATS), which would include amphetamine, methamphetamine 
and fenetylline, are generally reported together. Because, 
as discussed above, much captagon appears to actually be 
amphetamine, this is perhaps not a problem. However, it does 
mean that it is difficult to know how many people use captagon 
tablets, whatever they actually contain, or whether there is in 
fact any fenetylline use at all.
The UNODC has reported estimates for Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia on the use of ATS, excluding ‘ecstasy’-type substances. 
The annual prevalence of ATS use in the general population 
(aged 15-64) was estimated at 0.27 % in Kuwait (2005) and 
0.40 % in Saudi Arabia (2006). The accuracy of these estimates 
is unclear, but the UNODC suggests that these figures appear 
to be too low when viewed in the context of drug seizures in 
the region and therefore are probably underestimates (UNODC, 
2014). It is notable that the quantities of amphetamine 
intercepted in the Arabian Peninsula since 2008 make up more 
than 50 % of the global total.
Some very limited data are available on drug treatment in 
the region, but again it is difficult to interpret. It is reported 
that 3 027 people were treated for ATS use in Saudi Arabia 
in 2012, representing 51 % of all treatments recorded. 
A study conducted in the United Arab Emirates between 
2002 and 2011 reported alcohol as the most frequently 
used drug among the 367 patients treated, although this 
study also appears to indicate an increase in the number 
of patients receiving treatment for both amphetamine and 
methamphetamine use (Elkashef et al., 2013; UNODC, 2014).
In the absence of data on use, seizure data may provide some 
indication of patterns of use. Although robust quantitative data 
are lacking, interviews with law enforcement officers suggest 
that since 2014 illicit captagon seizures have been increasing 
in a number of Middle East countries (Israel, Jordan and 
United Arab Emirates, in particular) (8). However the limited 
quantitative seizure data available through annual reports 
made to the UNODC is challenging to interpret (https://data.
(8) Interview with Emirati, Jordanian and Israeli police officers, 
conducted April 2017.
unodc.org). In the data reported at country level, only in some 
cases are the seizures explicitly referred to as ‘captagon’. 
However, as the information from forensic analysis of seized 
captagon tablets suggests that in most cases the active 
ingredient is amphetamine, it is probable that a significant 
proportion of seizures reported as amphetamine are in the 
form of captagon tablets.
In 2015, Lebanon reported the seizure of more than 15 million 
illicit captagon tablets, which was around half the amount that 
was seized in 2014 — a record year (ISF, 2016). The cumulative 
quantities of seizures reported to the UNODC and designated 
‘captagon’ in five Arabian Peninsula states (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Yemen) between 2010 and 
2014 amount to 4.87 million tablets and 1.43 tonnes. During 
the same period, Saudi Arabia was the country that seized by 
far the largest quantities of amphetamine, totalling more than 
325 million tablets, with 100 million reported in 2014 alone. 
Although the Saudi authorities do not report this explicitly, 
it is likely that the majority of these tablets were captagon. 
The United Arab Emirates also reported nearly 41 kg of 
amphetamine in 2010, although again this was not specifically 
identified as ‘captagon’ (UNODC, 2014, 2016).
Tens of millions of tablets, most of which were identified as 
‘captagon’ were also seized between 2010 and 2014 in Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Figure 4). These countries are 
usually assumed to be transit or production territories for 
illicit captagon and not large consumer markets. This may 
be changing, however, as some recent information suggests 
that consumption in this area, particularly in Syria, may be 
increasing (UNODC, 2014, 2016).
FIGURE 4
Captagon tablets seized in a Lebanese laboratory
Photo © OCRTIS/DEASRI
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I The production and supply of captagon
As discussed above, captagon tablets seized in the Middle 
East appear to contain mainly amphetamine, and it follows 
that captagon may be described as amphetamine in tablet 
form. Most of the information available on the approaches 
to production of amphetamine, in bulk and tablet form, 
relates to the modi operandi of European-based synthetic 
drug producers, for which there is relatively solid evidence 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2011, 2016; EMCDDA, 2018). 
Although the extent to which this applies elsewhere is less 
well documented, the information available from the Middle 
East indicates that there are many similarities with European 
production methods and that some European organised crime 
groups are involved in amphetamine production in that region.
The production of illicit synthetic drugs sold in tablet form, 
such as captagon, may be broken down into two distinct 
parts: chemical synthesis of the active ingredient (here 
amphetamine), followed by the manufacture of tablets or 
tableting (here captagon). These two phases may take place 
in the same facility but may also often be carried out in 
different locations, or even different countries, and sometimes 
by separate groups (EMCDDA and Europol, 2011, 2016). 
Large organised crime groups specialising in synthetic drug 
production in Europe may manufacture the tablets themselves; 
however, it also appears common for amphetamine to 
be supplied ‘in bulk’ to third parties that will assume the 
responsibility for adding the necessary cutting agents and 
excipients, and pressing the tablets. Some evidence suggests 
that this may also be occurring in the Middle East and 
especially in Lebanon (Madlena, 2015; ISF, 2016).
Geographical separation of the different production phases 
may be used to reduce the risks of detection. Alternatively, it 
may reflect the fact that these two production phases require 
different chemicals, equipment and technical skills. Compared 
with synthesis of the active ingredient, tableting is the less 
technically demanding activity, and the necessary equipment 
(pill presses) and chemicals (cutting agents and excipients) 
are easier to access. When it occurs, this separation in roles 
also appears to have a number of important consequences. In 
particular, it may help explain the diversity seen in the content 
of seized illicit captagon tablets (German BKA, 2017). It may 
also result in more diversity, both geographically and in terms of 
the groups involved, in captagon production and trafficking. The 
decentralisation of production also makes it more challenging 
for law enforcement authorities to target the supply of this 
product effectively. Importantly, it also may make involvement 
in captagon tableting and distribution an attractive option for 
generating income for armed groups, based in or near countries 
The precursors of amphetamine
The main precursors of amphetamine are norephedrine 
and 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), also known as 
phenylacetone or BMK. These two chemicals are listed 
in Table I of the UN Convention of 1988. BMK can also be 
used to make methamphetamine, although ephedrine 
and pseudoephedrine (also listed in Table I) are more 
commonly used.
By far the most frequently used precursor for 
amphetamine manufacture is BMK. It was estimated that 
only 37 tonnes of BMK were needed in 2015 to meet 
all global licit requirements (INCB, 2015). It is, however, 
difficult to obtain this substance directly from legitimate 
businesses. This is because the trade in this chemical 
is closely monitored by national and international 
authorities and because of the low use of BMK in 
industry: it is mainly required for some limited purposes 
by the pharmaceutical industry. Buying large quantities 
of BMK from a legitimate company will, in principle, 
require a permit from at least one national authority. This 
means that procuring BMK represents a major challenge 
for amphetamine producers, and that the detection of 
diversion attempts is less challenging than for some other 
precursor chemicals that are used in larger quantities in 
industry.
An alternative approach is to synthesise BMK illegally 
from other substances (sometimes called pre-
precursors), not all of which have been placed under 
international control and some of which can be more 
easily obtained in large quantities, for example from 
chemical suppliers based in Asia. It is common today for 
illegal amphetamine producers to use pre-precursors, 
such as APAAN, or phenylacetic acid (PAA). As both of 
these have now been placed under international control, 
various other chemical routes for synthesis have emerged 
recently, for example using alpha-phenylacetoacetamide 
(APAA) or ‘masked’ forms of BMK such as BMK bisulphite 
or glycidic derivatives of BMK (EMCDDA and Europol, 
2011, 2016; INCB, 2018)] (9).
experiencing social or political unrest or conflicts, that lack 
the technical expertise and accompanying infrastructure 
necessary for synthetic drug production (Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2016).
(9) BMK is also a precursor of methamphetamine. According to the United 
Nations, synthesis of 1 kg of amphetamine or methamphetamine in 
a clandestine laboratory requires between 1.5 and 1.8 litres of BMK. 
Approximately 1.5 kg of phenylacetic acid is needed to produce 1 litre of BMK 
(INCB 2016b).
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I  Sources of supply (early 1990s to mid-2000s) —  the Bulgarian-Turkish connection
Producing captagon for the consumer markets in the Middle 
East has always been a transnational operation. Two key 
periods can be sketched out since the early 1990s.
From around 1990 to the mid-2000s, amphetamine produced 
in the Balkan region is thought to have been the main source 
for captagon sold in the consumer markets of the Middle East, 
especially of the Arabian Peninsula. Bulgarian and Turkish 
criminal networks, active in other drug trafficking in the Balkan 
region, also appear to have played an important role in illicit 
captagon production and trafficking.
During this period, significant amphetamine manufacture 
and tableting is known to have taken place in Bulgaria, and 
the captagon tablets produced were often exported via 
Turkey. Some more limited production is also likely to have 
occurred in Slovenia and Serbia. Amphetamine produced in 
Bulgaria is also known to have been exported to Turkey for 
tableting (INCB, 1999, 2003; UNODC, 2008). Amphetamine 
was also synthesised in Turkey, especially in Istanbul, and in 
the provinces of Gaziantep and Hatay (Antioch), which are on 
the border with Syria (UNODC, 2008; Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2016).
The Bulgarian and Turkish authorities took robust measures, 
between 2003 and 2006, to suppress illicit captagon 
manufacturing. In Bulgaria, this resulted in at least 18, mostly 
large-scale, laboratories involved in amphetamine synthesis 
and/or tableting being dismantled during this period. Bulgarian 
seizures of amphetamine powder and captagon tablets shot 
up, rising from 65 kg in 2001 to 1.45 tonnes in 2004 and 1.1 
tonnes in 2005, before falling to 113 kg in 2007. Action was 
also taken in Turkey, which reported the dismantling of 12 
laboratories (synthesis and tableting) in 2006 alone. Captagon 
seizures in Turkey increased from 1.1 million tablets in 2001 to 
nearly 9 million tablets in 2004 and 20 million in 2006, a record 
that has not been equalled since (UNODC, 2003, 2008; INCB, 
2009; EMCDDA and Europol, 2011; EMCDDA, 2017).
Captagon tablets from Turkey are likely to have been 
transported to the Arabian Peninsula by land either via 
Lebanon and Jordan and Syria or through Caucasus countries 
such as Georgia and Armenia. Transport by sea has also been 
observed. For example, in 2007, it is reported that captagon 
from Turkey was trafficked though the Balkans to western 
Europe and then shipped by boat to the Arabian Peninsula 
directly or via neighbouring countries (INCB, 1999; DEA, 
2003; UNODC,2008; EMCDDA and Europol, 2011; Courrier 
International, 2015; Global Initiative against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2016).
I  Changes from the mid-2000s onwards — displacement of production to the Middle East
By the mid-2000s, robust action by Bulgaria and Turkey 
appears to have reduced illicit captagon production but not 
eliminated it (EMCDDA and Europol, 2011; INCB, 2012, 
2013). Since then practices appear to have changed and 
there is more evidence of the sourcing of amphetamine for 
captagon production from a wider and more geographically 
dispersed set of countries. This development is consistent 
with broader changes seen in the production and trafficking of 
other drugs driven by increasing globalisation and the boom 
in containerised trade (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016; Global 
Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016).
From the mid-2000s onwards, amphetamine production 
and tableting also appears to have become more common 
closer to, or perhaps even in, the main consumer markets for 
captagon in the Arabian Peninsula. Documenting changes 
in illicit drug production is always challenging and the data 
available on captagon production are particularly limited, 
but the information available does suggest that production 
in the region increased from the mid-2000s onwards. It is 
also possible that, from 2011 onwards, the conflict in Syria 
had an impact on captagon production, although again this 
is difficult to substantiate empirically. However, it can be 
postulated that a combination of weak jurisdiction, increased 
demand by combatants or affected populations and various 
factions seeking access to funds through engagement with 
the drug trade may all have potentially resulted in a greater 
incentive to increase production of captagon within the region, 
although the extent to which this has happened remains 
unclear (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016, Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2016).
The evidence for the potentially increased production 
during this period comes from piecing together information 
on precursor imports (which may be diverted to illicit 
use), stopped shipments and seizures, alongside data on 
laboratories dismantled. This provides evidence that precursor 
availability in the region may have increased from the late 
2000s. Between 2008 and 2011, large quantities of the 
amphetamine precursor BMK were officially imported into 
Jordan and Iraq. In 2008, nearly 19 tonnes, around 75 % of 
all licit global trade in BMK for that year, was imported to ‘two 
countries in West Asia’ (10) for the manufacture of cleaning 
and disinfection products (INCB, 2009). In the following year 
(2009), the INCB noted that nearly 20 tonnes of BMK (around 
95 % of all licit world trade) was destined for ‘a single country 
in West Asia’, for the purpose of manufacturing detergents. 
(10) In the INCB reports, the collective term ‘West Asia’ covers a vast region 
encompassing the countries of the Middle East, the Caucasus and central 
Asia, and in particular includes Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (INCB, 
2010).
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The INCB also noted that, as many countries in West Asia 
had reported large seizures of captagon, there was a risk 
that some of this imported BMK could have been used for 
illicit amphetamine synthesis (potentially to be marketed as 
captagon) (INCB, 2010). The INCB also reported that, in 2009, 
the Indian authorities had stopped two BMK consignments, 
of 10 tonnes and 4 tonnes, destined for Jordan and Syria, 
respectively. In its 2010 report, the INCB explicitly named 
Jordan as the importer of nearly 9 tonnes of BMK intended for 
re-export to Iraq; this represents more than 60 % of the total 
licit world trade in this precursor in that year (INCB, 2011b). In 
2011, Jordan was reported to have authorised the import of 
approximately 50 tonnes of BMK, intended for export to Iraq 
for the manufacture of what the INCB referred to as an ‘alleged 
cleaning product’ (INCB, 2012). In 2012, imports of BMK were 
prohibited by the Jordanian government (INCB, 2013).
The INCB had questioned the ‘legitimacy’ of the imports of 
BMK into Jordan and Iraq in its 2010 report, in view of the fact 
that other chemical substances could be used to manufacture 
the household products concerned. It also noted that an 
analysis of the cleaning products in question ‘showed no 
traces of P-2-P [BMK]’ (INCB, 2011b, p. 9). Similarly, one year 
later, at the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the INCB reported 
additional analysis that suggested that the BMK content of 
a household product manufactured by an Iraqi company 
was 50 % lower than the declared level, suggesting the 
possibility that some of BMK required for its production may be 
unaccounted for (INCB, 2012).
In summary, during the period from 2008 to 2011, a total of 98 
tonnes of BMK was imported into Jordan, mostly for re-export 
to Iraq. This represents more than two thirds of the global trade 
in BMK during this period. The fate of these imports is unclear 
but, if even a small percentage of this precursor was diverted, 
it could have resulted in the production of large volumes of 
amphetamine and captagon. Theoretically, the total amount of 
precursor imported could have produced between 55 and 65 
tonnes of amphetamine if it had all been used for the purposes 
of drug synthesis (see section on ‘Production elsewhere in the 
region’ below).
Data on precursor seizures are also limited. Only one precursor 
seizure (498 kg of BMK by Syria in 2012) is officially reported 
to have taken place in the Middle East countries between 2006 
and 2012 (INCB, 2010, 2013). More recently, in 2015, 3.3 
tonnes of BMK and 16 tonnes of phenylacetic acid (also used 
for amphetamine production) were seized in Lebanon (ISF, 
2016). In 2016, that country also seized nearly a tonne of what 
was described as ‘a solid chemical’, which was suspected 
of being destined for use in amphetamine production (INCB, 
2017).
INCB reporting on precursor importation and seizures does 
not provide direct evidence of drug production, however, 
and specific data on amphetamine production in or near 
captagon-consuming countries are extremely limited. Lebanon, 
and recently Jordan, are the only countries reporting the 
dismantling of amphetamine synthesis laboratories in the 
last decade, with three clandestine laboratories reportedly 
dismantled in Lebanon in 2011 and one in Jordan in 2018 (see 
section on ‘Production elsewhere in the region’ below). A large-
scale amphetamine synthesis laboratory was also dismantled 
in Lebanon in 2015 (UNODC, 2009, 2016; Petra News Agency, 
2018). In this last case, the Lebanese army discovered two 
captagon production sites at Dar Al-Ouassa, a Shiite village in 
the Bekaa region (see Figure 5). In addition to the laboratory 
dedicated to amphetamine (and possibly BMK) synthesis, 
there was one dedicated to tablet manufacture (Stephan, 
2016).
FIGURE 5 
Imports of precursors, and production and exports of 
captagon in Lebanon
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The limited official data reported to international authorities, 
taken together with information from law enforcement sources, 
does lend weight to the argument that production may have 
increased. It also suggests a link to European organised crime 
groups specialising in synthetic drug production (see the box 
below). In particular, the presence of European ‘specialists’ 
in the illicit synthesis of amphetamine in the Middle East has 
been identified by law enforcement sources. For example, 
Bulgarian ‘experts’ have been reported to be present in the 
region from the mid-2000s onwards, and one arrest was 
reported in Lebanon in 2014 (UNODC, 2009; EMCDDA 
and Europol, 2013; Global Initiative against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2016; ISF, 2016). Several Belgian and Dutch 
‘experts’ have also been reported in the region (11).
I Production in Syria?
The UNODC reports that, in addition to Lebanon, Syria is also 
likely to be a source country for captagon tablets seized in the 
Arabian Peninsula, neighbouring countries and Turkey (UNODC, 
2016). A number of other sources also make this case. In 
2011, the Syrian authorities reported eight individual seizures 
of ‘captagon’, totalling 8 kg and 77 000 tablets, to the UNODC 
and stated that the captagon had been produced in Syria. It is 
possible, however, that only the tablets were produced in Syria, 
using amphetamine imported from Lebanon or elsewhere and 
no subsequent seizures from Syria were reported (UNODC, 
2017a). A much-cited Reuters article from 2014 reported that 
amphetamine was being produced in Syria (Kalin, 2014). In 
2016, the non-governmental organisation Global Initiative 
against Transnational Organized Crime (2016) also reported 
that this was occurring, based on information from sources in 
the Bulgarian, Lebanese and Turkish police forces, as well as 
seizures of captagon tablets made at the Lebanese and Turkish 
borders with Syria. That report also suggests that laboratories 
had been discovered in Syria, in both government-controlled 
areas and areas controlled by the jihadist group Jabhat Fateh 
al-Sham (previously known as the al-Nusra Front, affiliated with 
al-Qaeda until 2016). It does not, however, cite its sources for this 
information or specify whether the sites in question were engaged 
in drug synthesis or only tableting. However, this conclusion is 
supported by information provided to the EMCDDA by Turkish 
authorities concerning several large captagon seizures involving 
Syrian nationals. This includes three large seizures in 2015-16 
and they also report that in 2018 they seized 5.4 million tablets 
on the border between Turkey and Syria as well as dismantling 
clandestine captagon laboratories during cross-border operations. 
It should also be noted that, although the evidence relating to 
precursor seizures raises suspicions that production of captagon 
may have occurred, until these recent reports from Turkey there 
had been no official reports of laboratory seizures in Syria.
(11) Police source, 2016.
Case study: The role of European ‘experts’
In February 2016, a Belgian national was arrested in 
Lebanon (Belga, 2016) in possession of a false passport. 
This individual was known to be a high-level member 
of a multinational gang of synthetic drug producers 
operating in Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey. 
He was subsequently extradited to Belgium, where 
a 15-year prison sentence was pending against him for 
his involvement in one of the biggest clandestine MDMA 
laboratories ever discovered in Europe, dismantled in 
Belgium in August 2013 (Europol, 2013; La Capitale, 
2013; Huyberechts, 2016; Belga, 2017).
The use of similar equipment may also indicate a link 
with producers based in Europe. In the production sites 
dismantled by the Lebanese army at Dar Al-Ouassa 
in December 2015 (see Figure 5), a visual inspection 
of the reaction vessels used on site revealed that they 
were very similar to custom-made pressure reaction 
vessels for illicit synthetic drug production seized in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. The size and number of vessels 
and other equipment at Dar Al-Ouassa suggested that 
the laboratory had the capacity to produce large volumes 
of amphetamine. The rotary tablet press found on site 
had a maximum production capacity of 216 000 tablets 
per hour, according to the manufacturer (Fluidpack, 
undated) (12).
It is suspected that the Belgian national mentioned above 
was associated with the production sites in Dar Al-
Ouassa, probably in partnership with members of a Shiite 
clan that has been linked with drug trafficking activities 
and that also owned the premises that housed these 
laboratories (13,14).
(12) The discovery of this high-output specialist tableting machine is unusual, 
as captagon tableting operations in Lebanon are reported to usually use 
machines that were originally designed for sweet making and have been 
modified for tablet production (interview with the drug squad, Beirut, 
18 May 2016).
(13) The arrest in October 2015 of a member of the Saudi royal family and four 
other Saudi nationals at Beirut airport, while they were preparing to board 
a private jet bound for Riyadh loaded with over 2 tonnes of captagon (and 
an unknown quantity of cocaine), made the headlines (BBC, 2015; L’Orient 
le jour, 2015; Stephan, 2015). In addition, four other fugitives were wanted 
in connection with the case. According to information obtained in Beirut in 
May 2016, one of these individuals was a member of the Shiite clan of Dar 
Al-Ouassa who had been responsible for supplying the drugs. It is difficult to 
judge the veracity of this information. 
(14) According to information obtained in Beirut, the army originally went into Dar 
Al-Ouassa on 29 December and discovered the laboratories because they 
were looking for those responsible for the death of a Lebanese soldier who 
had been killed the previous day in a confrontation with members of the Shiite 
clan who owned the premises. One of the people arrested on this occasion 
was the subject of more than 70 Lebanese arrest warrants.
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The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 
analysis suggests that political and commercial links between 
Bulgaria and Ba’athist Syria have existed since the 1980s, 
and these may have enabled alliances between Syrian and 
Bulgarian criminal organisations. This, and the outbreak of 
the civil war in 2011, may have initially provided impetus for 
the establishment of amphetamine production laboratories 
in Syria. However, subsequently, conflicts between different 
factions have threatened the security of these laboratories 
and production is said to have moved to Lebanon and possibly 
Turkey (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 2016).
Other sources also support the suggestion that the conflict 
in Syria has resulted in the displacement of some production 
to neighbouring countries (15). Two Lebanese seizures, 
totalling 12 million captagon tablets originating from Syria, 
were made in August 2013 (Baker, 2013; FARS News Agency, 
2013; Henley, 2014). The head of the Lebanese drug squad 
was reported as noting that the second shipment seized 
belonged to a Sunni Syrian businessman based in Homs. He 
was suspected of funding ‘secular opposition’ to the Syrian 
regime and fled the fighting in Syria to set up his illicit business 
in Lebanon. This account appears to be the basis for various 
subsequent media reports, including a documentary by the 
BBC (Madlena, 2015).
However, the most recent INCB report on precursors also 
indicates that amphetamine and captagon may be produced 
in Syria. After reporting that a shipment of 24 tonnes of 
phenylacetic acid destined for Syria was stopped in India in 
2017, the INCB expressed the concern that Syrian companies 
may be used to import BMK or its precursors, and added that 
‘existing manufacturing facilities’ in Syria could be misused to 
produce amphetamine illegally (INCB, 2018, p.18).
I Production elsewhere in the region
The dismantling of an amphetamine production and captagon 
tableting facility in Amman, Jordan, in January 2018 may 
shed some light on the fate of some of the 98 tonnes of 
the precursor BMK imported into Jordan and Iraq during 
the four years preceding the war in Syria. As noted above, 
legitimate use or clandestine re-export may account for some 
this total. However, the police raid in Amman leaves little 
doubt that a proportion was used for the illicit production 
of amphetamine. The press reported that several tonnes 
of chemicals and drug production equipment were seized 
from the illicit laboratory in the Jordanian capital, which 
was operating under the guise of manufacturing detergents 
(see section on ‘Changes from the mid-2000s onwards’). 
(15) Police sources in Lebanon, May 2016, and Stephan (2016).
In addition, about 2 million captagon tablets were seized at 
another location, and the eight people arrested in connection 
with the case included ‘foreign nationals’ who assisted the 
main suspect in synthesising the amphetamine and producing 
the captagon pills (Petra News Agency, 2018; Al Jazeera, 
2018).
Although no amphetamine, methamphetamine or heroin 
laboratories have been reportedly detected in Iraq since 
2001, it should be noted that the country, especially the 
northern area on the border with Iran, Turkey and Syria, has 
often been associated with attempts to divert other precursor 
chemicals, in particular large quantities of ephedrine and 
pseudoephedrine and of acetic anhydride (used in the 
production of heroin). It is of note that the assessment of the 
country’s pseudoephedrine requirements carried out annually 
by the Iraqi authorities increased 10-fold between 2007 and 
2010. This increased amount is reported by the INCB to exceed 
the legitimate annual per capita requirements (INCB, 2012). 
The INCB also notes that its requests for information about 
Iraqi companies involved in importing precursors have not 
elicited a response from the Iraqi government (INCB, 2009, 
2011b, 2012, 2013). More recently, the INCB expressed its 
concern that ‘substantial amounts’ of medicines containing 
pseudoephedrine are exported from Jordan to the ‘Kurdistan 
region’ of northern Iraq in spite of objections from the 
competent authorities in Bagdad (INCB, 2018). Taken together, 
this information raises questions about Iraq’s potential role 
as a source country for precursors and a location for drug 
production, including captagon. That said, a lack of hard data 
makes drawing any conclusions on this issue difficult. The last 
captagon seizure data reported for Iraq is from 2010, when at 
least 1.5 tonnes of it was intercepted.
Overall, there is considerable uncertainty about current 
production in the region. While large volumes of captagon 
tablets are seized every year in the Arab world, and at times 
large volumes of amphetamine precursors have been imported 
into the Middle East, only five amphetamine synthesis 
laboratories have been officially dismantled in the region 
since 2010. With the exception of Lebanon, and recently 
Jordan, the synthesis of amphetamine is rarely reported by law 
enforcement or other authorities, although there are sufficient 
indications to suspect that production has, or is, taking place in 
other countries in the region.
Overall, it is probably correct to conclude that the situation with 
respect to production, trafficking and use of captagon is likely 
to be quite fluid and could change rapidly in the context of the 
evolving security, political and economic situations. Therefore, 
improving the surveillance of trends in the development of 
drug production and use in the region should be regarded 
as an important task, albeit one that presents significant 
challenges.
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I Diversification of amphetamine sources
It is also likely that the captagon supply is supported by 
amphetamine produced outside the Middle East.
Afghanistan has been reported to be a methamphetamine 
producing country for several years and, in 2010, its neighbour 
Pakistan reported amphetamine production taking place there 
(UNODC, 2014, 2017b). A seizure of 4 kg of amphetamine 
was made in Karachi in 2012 (UNODC, 2013) and, in 2014 
and 2015, the Pakistani government reported to the UNODC 
a number of seizures of amphetamine destined for the Arabian 
Peninsula, mainly Saudi Arabia. In many of these cases, the 
Pakistani authorities reported that the amphetamine seized 
originated from Afghanistan.
Most of the seizures reported by Pakistan in 2014 related 
to small quantities (between 85 g and 1.2 kg) and totalled 
approximately 18 kg. In 2015, however, the total was 
2.875 tonnes and included two large seizures of 1 tonne and 
1.8 tonnes, which were made in Quetta, the capital of the 
Pakistani province of Baluchistan (UNODC, 2017a). Although 
Pakistan does not report the origin or destination of this 
amphetamine, it is plausible that the drug was destined for 
export to the Arabian Peninsula. The Baloch coast on the 
Arabian Sea, known as the ‘Makran coast’ has been known for 
many years as an established route for trafficking heroin by 
sea to the Arabian Peninsula, and more recently to East Africa 
(EMCDDA, 2015).
Iran has, over the last decade, become an important producer 
and exporter of methamphetamine to a number of countries 
including neighbouring Gulf states (UNODC, 2014). This 
suggests the potential for amphetamine production, although 
the evidence to support this suggestion is limited. However, 
Turkey reported that it seized 80 kg of amphetamine in 
a vehicle originating from Iran in 2012 and suggested that 
the drug was destined for captagon tablet manufacture 
(TUBIM, 2013). It is also conceivable that some of the 
methamphetamine synthesised in Iran may be used for 
captagon production, although to date there is no forensic 
evidence to support this.
I Continuing European connections
The EMCDDA and Europol have previously reported that 
the consumer markets for captagon are also supplied with 
amphetamine synthesised in some Balkan countries that 
are not members of the EU and in Caucasus countries 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2013). Amphetamine has been 
produced in Serbia since at least the beginning of the 2000s, 
and amphetamine synthesis laboratories and captagon 
tableting facilities there were dismantled in 2003. At the 
time, one of these was the biggest amphetamine synthesis 
laboratories ever discovered in Europe (Nevescanin et al., 
2008). The National report on the drug situation in Serbia, 
published in 2014, reported the dismantling of two smaller 
scale laboratories in 2010: one was producing amphetamine 
sulphate and the other BMK. The amphetamine was reported 
to be destined for export to Bulgaria (EMCDDA, 2014). The 
UNODC reported that two amphetamine laboratories were 
dismantled in Armenia in 2010, although no details are 
available (UNODC, 2012).
There is also evidence that amphetamine synthesised in 
the EU was and continues to be used to produce captagon 
tablets destined for markets in the Arabian Peninsula. In the 
World drug report 2009, the UNODC reports information from 
the Iranian, Lebanese and Turkish police forces indicating 
that amphetamine produced in Poland was sent to Bulgaria 
where it was tableted then exported to the Arabian Peninsula 
via Turkey in the form of captagon (UNODC, 2009). It is also 
possible that captagon is still being tableted in Bulgaria now, 
using amphetamine produced elsewhere: in January 2016, 
nearly 110 kg of captagon tablets were seized in the Bulgarian 
city of Plovdiv and several suspects were arrested, including 
a Jordanian and a Palestinian. According to police and press 
sources, the tablets were destined for the Arabian Peninsula 
and the amphetamine that they contained probably came from 
the Netherlands (DNES, 2016). Elsewhere, a captagon site 
was dismantled in the Athens area in early March 2017. Nearly 
640 000 tablets were seized and four people were arrested: 
two Greeks, one Albanian and one Turk (AFP, 2017). The 
information available indicates that this was a tableting facility. 
The results of the analyses of the tablets seized in Greece 
are not yet available, so the nature and, more importantly, 
the source of any amphetamine that they contained is as yet 
unknown. It should be noted, however, that, although Greece is 
not known as a synthetic drug producer, it does share borders 
with two countries that are ‘historical’ centres of amphetamine 
production, Bulgaria and Turkey, and that one of the suspects 
arrested in this case was Turkish.
Turkey could thus have become a source of amphetamine 
once again. According to the report by the Global Initiative 
against Transnational Organized Crime (2016), the conflict 
in Syria has led to captagon production sites moving not only 
to Lebanon but also to the Turkish provinces of Hatay and 
Gaziantep. These provinces border Syria and laboratories 
were operating there during the 2000s. The report quotes the 
DEA as the source of this information but does not specify 
whether the sites in question were synthesis laboratories or 
tableting facilities. In any event, over the last 10 years Turkey, 
the historical hub of captagon trafficking, has also become 
a large consumer market for ecstasy imported from Belgium 
and the Netherlands, sometimes in exchange for heroin and 
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precursor chemicals (16) (TUBIM, 2013; EMCDDA, 2016; Tops 
et al., 2018). In Europe, amphetamine and MDMA production 
require similar equipment and processes and are frequently 
carried out by the same criminal organisations (EMCDDA and 
Europol, 2011). It is also likely that the drug present in some of 
the tablets sold as ecstasy in Turkey is amphetamine and not 
MDMA (UNODC, 2014).
Moreover, there is a consumer market for captagon tablets in 
Turkey. Two tableting laboratories were dismantled there at the 
end of 2011, close to the Syrian border, while the Turkish police 
report that they have ‘from time to time’ obtained information 
suggesting that captagon is still being produced in the country 
(TUBIM, 2013). Collaboration between Turkish and Belgian-
Dutch criminal groups on the production and trafficking of 
synthetic drugs, highlighted in particular by the case study in 
the box above, suggests that some of the captagon market 
may now be, or is once again being, supplied from Turkey and 
western Europe.
A number of recent cases in the Netherlands could confirm 
this hypothesis. In March 2016, an Afghan refugee living in the 
Netherlands was arrested for producing captagon pills that 
he intended to barter for heroin. In April 2016, the Dutch law 
enforcement authority seized tablets and punches bearing the 
captagon logo from a house in Rotterdam. A year later, police 
dismantled a captagon (and probably MDMA) tableting facility 
located on a farm in the southern Netherlands. According to 
the Dutch authorities and media reports, more than 3 kg of 
captagon tablets containing a mixture of amphetamine and 
caffeine were seized at the site, in addition to a tablet press, 
punches with the captagon logo and dozens of kilograms of 
amphetamine and MDMA in powder form. A suspect born in 
Lebanon was arrested in connection with this case. Finally, 
in August 2017, pills and punches bearing the captagon logo 
were seized at a tableting site in the southern Netherlands; 
a Turkish connection is suspected here (Associated Press, 
2017; BBC, 2017; Dutch Police, 2017).
(16) According to the Turkish focal point of the Reitox network, most of the MDMA 
seized in Turkey comes from Belgium and the Netherlands. The quantities of 
‘ecstasy’ (MDMA, MDA, MDEA) seized in Turkey have risen continuously since 
2010, and in 2013 Turkey alone seized more ecstasy than all the countries of 
the EU combined.
I  Media reporting on captagon use and recent terrorist attacks
The use of stimulant drugs, especially amphetamine, by 
military personnel or combatants in conflicts has a long history 
(Boustany, 1993; Hautefeuille, 2002; Rasmussem, 2011; 
Kamieński, 2016). Furthermore, money from drug trafficking 
may sometimes be a source of income for some insurgent 
or terrorist groups. Some terrorist perpetrators in Europe 
have also been found to have a background that includes 
involvement in petty crime and drug use or drug dealing. 
However, the links between drug use and terrorism are difficult 
to identify in existing data sources and, when they exist, they 
often appear to be indirect (see EMCDDA and Europol, 2016, 
for a longer discussion on this topic).
In this section we explore the more specific question of the 
veracity of information from media sources that suggests 
links between captagon use and jihadist terrorism, since 
a considerable number of media reports suggest links between 
captagon and either the war in Syria or terrorist attacks: at 
times captagon has been referred to ‘the terrorist drug’, ‘jihadi 
magic potion’, ‘the Daesh drug’ or even ‘the Jihad drug’. It 
has been suggested in the media and in a few academic 
articles that captagon has been used by some perpetrators of 
terrorist attacks in Europe and, more widely, by combatants in 
jihadist groups that are active in Syria or in the radicalisation 
of those who have joined jihadist organisations such as IS 
(Henley, 2014; Allodocteurs.fr, 2015; ARTE, 2015; Aveline, 
2015; Bernas, 2015; Courrier International, 2015; Euronews, 
2015; Ganhão, 2015; Hernández Velasco, 2015; Holley, 2015; 
L’Orient le jour, 2015; Loumé, 2015; Madlena, 2015; Nguyen, 
2015; Nisa, 2015; Orsini, 2015; Peters, 2015; Pham-Lé, 2015; 
Quelen, 2015; RTS, 2015; Todd, 2015; Zemouri, 2015; Crettiez, 
2016; Des Déserts, 2016; Fond and Howes, 2016; N-TV, 2016; 
RTP, 2016; Technikart, 2016; AFP, 2017; BBC, 2017; Wenthur 
et al., 2017).
Following the attack in the Bataclan venue (Paris) on 
13 November 2015, one eye-witness was quoted as reporting 
that the attackers seemed to be under the influence of drugs 
(Mereu-Boulch, 2015). Media interest was also fuelled by 
a video of syringes, which in fact were being used for forensic 
science investigation but were wrongly interpreted as evidence 
of drug injecting before the attack (Zemouri, 2015). Some 
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experts contacted by the media commented (17) on the 
possible effects of using fenetylline and in some cases went 
further and speculated on its possible influence on the attacks. 
However, subsequent autopsy reports on the bodies of the 
terrorists did not detect the use of ‘illicit drugs or alcohol’ 
before carrying out the attack (Pelletier, 2016) (18). It should 
also be noted that any captagon consumed by the perpetrators 
would most likely have consisted of amphetamine in any 
case. There have been no suggestions of captagon use by 
the terrorists who carried out the Brussels airport and metro 
attacks on 22 March 2016, nor has captagon use been directly 
implicated in attacks in other European countries (19).
Some information exists that suggests the possible use 
of captagon by Seifeddine Rezgui, the perpetrator of the 
Kalashnikov attack of 26 June 2015 in Tunisia (HM Coroner, 
2017). Extracts from the report by the Tunisian judge who 
investigated the attacks noted: ‘Toxicological tests revealed 
the presence of a drug, the main effects of which include 
“the feeling of exhaustion, aggression and extreme anger 
that leads to murders being committed. Another effect 
of these drugs is that they enhance physical and mental 
performance.” ’ (HM Coroner, 2017, p. 34). This would suggest 
the use of a stimulant drug, but no further details are made 
available in the report. A subsequent report in a British tabloid 
newspaper indicated that an informed Tunisian source 
reported that cocaine had been used by the perpetrator 
(Greenhill and Sinmaz, 2015). This suggestion may have been 
influenced by an earlier report on the Vice News website in 
January 2015 entitled ‘Video shows cocaine allegedly found at 
home of Islamic State leader’. This video was filmed at Kobane, 
a town in northern Syria, during a period when the Kurdish 
People’s Protection Units (YPG) were in the process of fighting 
IS (Medin, 2015). A Vanity Fair article in April 2016 entitled 
‘Captagon, enquête sur la drogue des terroristes’ (‘Captagon, 
investigation into the terrorist drug’), reported that a ‘highly 
placed official from the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior’ stated: 
‘The subject Rezgui exhibited a significant presence of the 
product Captagon, consumed over several weeks on multiple 
occasions before his death.’ This anonymous official also 
(17) A neurobiologist who specialises in addictions stated in an interview with 
Sciences et Avenir on 17 November 2015 that the attackers were probably 
under the influence of fenetylline. According to this researcher, fenetylline 
‘makes the person who takes it feel all-powerful’, and the magazine concluded: 
‘This enables him to kill without fearing a reaction by other people, who no 
longer even exist as far as he is concerned’ (Loumé, 2015). Curiously, this 
latter quotation is also attributed to another scientist, a doctor specialising in 
addictions, who was invited to comment on the attack at Sousse in Tunisia in 
a France Info article published on 3 July 2015 (Allodocteurs.fr, 2015), more 
than four months before the publication of Sciences et Avenir (Loumé, 2015). 
However, on this occasion the doctor added an important detail that did not 
appear in Sciences et Avenir: ‘But taking captagon isn’t enough to make you 
shoot 38 people! In this case, the drug was acting on a “pre-formatted” brain.’
(18) These results were confirmed on 19 July 2016 by the French police’s Unité 
de coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste (UCLAT — Coordination Unit for the 
Fight Against Terrorism) in an email to the OFDT.
(19) The autopsy on the body of the perpetrator of the failed attack at Orly airport 
on 18 March 2017 found traces of alcohol, cannabis and cocaine (Le Monde, 
2017).
suggested that the perpetrators of the attack at the Bardo 
museum in Tunis in 2015 had also taken ‘Captagon’ before 
carrying out the attack. The article concludes by saying: ‘The 
autopsies leave no doubt that the Captagon found came from 
Syria’ (Des Déserts, 2015). The veracity of this is difficult to 
assess but again, if true, would probably suggest the presence 
of amphetamine in toxicological findings. How its origin would 
have been identified is equally unclear, but is unlikely to 
have been possible from forensic investigation of biological 
samples.
In summary, despite media speculation, it is difficult to 
substantiate any clear or direct link between captagon use and 
terrorist atrocities. Combatants in many conflicts are known to 
use stimulants for functional purposes, especially to address 
fatigue. The psychological properties of these drugs may be 
attractive to some in conflict zones and stimulants are thought 
to play an aggravating role in some cases of violent crime. The 
excessive use of amphetamine has also been shown to cause 
a short-lived psychotic episode in some individuals (Bramness 
et al., 2012). As captagon, usually containing amphetamine, is 
available in countries in the Middle East that are experiencing 
conflict, its use by combatants, including those affiliated 
to terrorist organisations, is quite possible but difficult to 
substantiate. The extent to which stimulant use may increase 
or aggravate in some way the considerable levels of violence 
seen in this region by those involved in the conflict or terrorist 
activities is a question for speculation. However, it is clear that 
drug use per se cannot be viewed as a major causal factor in 
these terrorist activities.
Involvement in drug production or trafficking is also a common 
source of income for many criminal groups, and it may also 
be a source of income for some of the terrorist organisations 
relevant here. Some media accounts have suggested that this 
may be the case but it remains an area that merits further 
investigation. As noted above, the data available mean that 
any comment on the production, use or trafficking of captagon 
needs to be made with caution.
Similarly, while some of those involved in terrorist attacks 
in Europe are known to have a background that includes 
petty crime and involvement in drug use or the drug market, 
any simple or direct causal relationship between drug use 
and subsequent terrorist activities in Europe cannot be 
substantiated. Media accounts that suggest that captagon 
may represent a special challenge in this respect appear at 
best misinformed and at worst unhelpful.
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I Conclusion
It is clear from the information presented in this report that 
firm evidence concerning both use and supply of captagon is 
sparse and sporadic. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, it would appear that captagon, as it is 
now, is generally amphetamine with a captagon logo on it. 
While captagon was originally mainly sourced from eastern 
Europe, production appears to have shifted into the Middle 
East where the main market is — but data are very limited 
so it is hard to say anything for certain. However, a European 
connection has probably remained, with European criminal 
expertise involved in production in the Middle East. It also 
appears that some amphetamine produced in Europe may be 
shipped to the Middle East and in some cases tableted there. 
Finally, the suggestions of strong links between terrorism and 
captagon use that have featured in many media reports appear 
to have been overstated. As is the case for other types of drug, 
some terrorist groups may exploit the captagon market to 
finance their activities and some terrorists may at times use 
captagon or other drugs, but the evidence available does not 
indicate any particular association between captagon and 
terrorism. This review also highlights the need for improved 
data collection on this topic, in particular forensic analysis and 
prevalence of use in key consumer markets.
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